W.G. V THE CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT OF THE GARDA NATIONAL IMMIGRATION BUREAU AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY [2019] IEHC 623
The Applicant in this case is a national of Pakistan who sought Judicial Review of the decision of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal to uphold the prior decision of the Refugee Applications Commissioner to recommend his transfer to the United Kingdom under the European Union (Dublin System) Regulations 2014 The court refused the application on the following grounds:
1. The time limit to give effect to the transfer order provided for in the Dublin III Regulations had not expired during the course of the judicial review proceedings;
2. The marriage between the applicant and a European Union citizen was considered to be a marriage of convenience and was therefore invalid;
3. The proceedings would have been dismissed in any event due to being an abuse of process of the courts and abuse of rights under European Union law.
KANT -V- THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY; S.I.
(BANGLADESH) -V- THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY AND S.I.
(BANGLADESH) -V- THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY [2019]
IEHC 583
The Applicants in this joint judgment previously entered the State on student visas and were granted permission to reside under s. 4 of the Immigration Act 2004. They subsequently both married E.U. nationals and applied for residence cards to reside in the State under the European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015 (S.I. No. 548 of 2015), with Mr Kant’s application being approved.
They then later applied for permission to remain in their own right under s. 4 of the Immigration Act 2004. The Minister for Justice and Equality refused to accept their applications because they were not persons in possession of extant permission to reside under that Act. The main issue in the proceedings was whether the Minister was correct in taking that view. Mr Justice Humphreys refused both applications finding as follows:
1. An EU Fam stamp 4 permission to a qualified family member in the exercise of EU Treaty Rights is not a permission under s. 4 of the Immigration Act 2004.
2. Where an Applicant who had a permission under s. 4 of the 2004 Act but then moves on to a different permission not under s. 4, or alternatively lets that permission expire without applying to renew its currency or very shortly thereafter, and thus is not the holder of an extant permission under s. 4 of the 2004 Act, such an applicant is precluded from making a renewal application under s. 4 of the 2004 Act or a free-standing application under that section.
3. In respect of persons not entitled to make applications under s. 4 of the 2004 Act, the Minister is not obliged to consider any application made under his residual or executive discretion in a free-standing manner, whether he is requested to do so or not, and may deal with any discretionary application in the context of submissions made under s. 3 of the Immigration Act 1999.
SARFRAZ ISLAM (A MINOR SUING THROUGH HIS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND SAIFUL ISLAM) AND SAFREEN ISLAM (A MINOR SUING THROUGH HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND SAIFUL ISLAM) -V- THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS [2019] IEHC 559
Mr Justice Humphreys in this case granted an order of Certiorari quashing the decision of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to cancel the Irish passports of the two minor Applicants, on the grounds that the Minister failed to follow the proper procedures.
On the 6th of December 2018, the Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote to the Applicants mother regarding the cancellation of their passports. The Applicants argued that the letter was a notice of a decision to cancel the passports under s. 18 of the Passports Act 2008. The Respondent submitted that it was a notice of intention to cancel the passports unless the Minister was persuaded otherwise by submissions made.
The Court found that the letter should have said either that the Minister was cancelling the passports without notice due to his assessment of the public interest and that he would receive any post-cancellation submissions, or alternatively that the Minister was proposing to cancel and was allowing a defined period for submissions before a final decision.
The court remitted the matter back to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade for reconsideration and held that if the Minister intends to cancel the passports without notice because the public interest so requires, he should notify the Applicants of that decision and invite post-cancellation submissions. It held that if the Minister doesn’t consider that the public interest requires dispensing with notice, but still intends to cancel the passports, he should write to the Applicants informing them of his proposal and giving them 28 days to make any submissions as to whether the passports should be cancelled prior to making a decision. The 28 days the court noted is specific to the present case and in ordinary course the Minister is perfectly entitled to fix a shorter and perhaps a much shorter period.
L.F. (South Africa) -v- The International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors 2019] IEHC 512
The Applicant in this case is a national of South Africa who entered the State in February 2016 and applied for asylum with the application later becoming an application for international protection. The proceedings in question sought an order of Certiorari quashing certain paragraphs of the decision of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal dated 14 th of August 2018 rejecting her appeals.
The High Court granted judicial review of the decision on the grounds that the International Protection Appeals Tribunal’s internal relocation findings, in particular the finding that she could avoid telling her children where she was, was unreasonable, and the internal relocation finding could be severed from the decision. It limited the order of certiorari quashing the decision to the extent of paras. 5.13 to 5.19, 7.1, 8.7 to 8.9 and 10.1, of the decision and remitted the matter to the same tribunal member to complete the decision in accordance with the judgment of the court.
